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GROUP ACTS AND MISSED ENCOUNTER: LACAN 
AND FOULKES1
Erica Burman
Prologue
The theme of action outside speech typically does not gain positive 
treatment in psychoanalytical contexts, with all such action vulnerable 
to being designated “acting out”, or at best “acting in”.  But the 
question “how to act” transcends such false oppositions between 
acting and not acting, to topicalise instead ethical responsibility and 
social engagement. In this paper these themes are explored in terms 
of the relations between Lacanian psychoanalytic and Foulkesian 
group analytic ideas. The assertion of the priority of one model over 
the other, or the assimilation of one to the other is not aimed at here, 
but rather this paper seeks to highlight, and perhaps indicate, some 
potential evaluations of how each approach attempts to engage with 
the question of action. 
While Lacanian psychoanalysis often draws a strong 
boundary around the analytic space, resisting the generalization of 
psychoanalytic phenomena outside the clinic, the social model of the 
psyche to which group analysts are committed, means that no such 
absolute distinctions can be maintained. Paradoxically, group analysts 
seem rather more reluctant than Lacanians to discuss questions of 
ethics, preferring to talk about questions of democracy, although both 
models share an understanding of analytical process in terms of the 
1  This article is a version of a paper delivered at  APPI’s 17th Annual Congress (2010) entitled; How 
to Act – Ethics and the Psychoanalytic Clinic in a Culture of Suppression and Demand.
24
Lacunae
25
promotion of (if also the impossibility of) free speech. The challenge 
therefore, is to find ways of both analyzing and intervening in, the 
contexts that give rise to analysis. A brief historical review of the 
development of group analysis indicates how this approach in fact 
has always done this, though – like other models – not always with 
broader ethical-political agendas in mind.
Although it is via the perspectives of group analysis and  certain 
feminist and antiracist activism that these themes are explored here, 
this view also comprises a certain sympathy and attunement to 
Lacanian approaches.2 
Act I: The Matheme and the Matrix?
At first glance group analysis and Lacanian psychoanalysis seem 
quite opposed. Obscure and esoteric Lacanian theory (of mathemes, 
for example) rubs against what is perhaps a rather naïve and under-
elaborated theoretical openness in group analysis, and occasional 
mysticism around “trusting the group” - not to mention the troubling 
incipient gender essentialisms elaborated from the maternalist 
imagery of the matrix3. The Anglophone psychiatric, as well as 
psychoanalytic legacy weighs heavily on group analysis (generated 
as it was from England), including a rather concrete humanism that 
rather fetishises the face to face encounter (that – for Lacanians – of 
course must work at the level of the imaginary). 
Yet these readings are perhaps contingent rather than necessary, 
and perhaps there are significant areas of continuity and overlap, 
2  In exploring this mutual engagement between Lacan and Foulkes, my readings here both owe 
much to, but also are independently formulated from, those of Dieter Nitzgen (1999; 2008a, 
2008b).
3  Within Latinate languages anyway. However elsewhere, including where there are group analytic 
trainings, terms such the matrix carry very different connotations (of sci-fi films for example).
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even around the role of desire for the speaking subject.4 For different 
reasons, it is possible to trace how some similar commitments 
emerge that touch on this theme of action. Of particular relevance 
to the theme of “acts”, is the model of change. In group analysis, 
unlike some other forms of psychoanalysis (but in common with 
Lacanian psychoanalysis), this model of change is based on action 
and reflection upon action; it is not insight-led but rather the action 
of and in the group both creates and identifies change; that is, the 
group is both the agent that makes the difference and the medium 
for recognising that something is now different. Foulkes argues that:
The group acts as if it knew what we call the dynamic unconscious. It 
can also work its way to fully conscious awareness, to have full insight. 
Change, however, results from the interacting processes themselves even 
before they are made conscious. In this view, change is, therefore, the 
cause of insight, not its consequence. (Foulkes, 1990, p. 291)
This can be connected with the technical imperative to work in, rather 
than interpret, the transference in Lacanian analysis (Collet, 1993).
Act II: Current Contexts
It should be noted that the reflections here were prompted by 
some recollections of group and individual actions, of varying kinds 
of efficacy and publicity – some of which arose in analytic contexts. 
4  See also for example: “Lacan’s understanding of the conflictual relationship between the 
registers of demand and desire corresponds to Foulkes’ conception of the analytic process in 
groups insofar as both emphasize the articulation of desire in speech as the principal action of 
analysis… There is a striking similarity between Lacan’s concept of desire and Foulkes’ “social 
model of consciousness” (Foulkes, 1964, p. 253, p. 264). What is at issue in the group, therefore, 
is essentially a question of going beyond the imaginary demands for love (and, accordingly hate) by 
getting access to the symbolic (Laxenaire, 1983, p. 175). It is only by mutual recognition within the 
symbolic matrix of the group that desire can be brought into existence. However, what is brought 
into existence by mutual recognition, desire, is not, as Lacan insists, something already “given”. 
In naming his/her desire, “the subject creates, brings forth a new presence in the world” (1954-5, 
p. 229). “This marks the surprising, unforeseeable, creative moment in psychoanalysis as well as 
in group analysis.” (Nitzgen,1999, p.234).
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Also, mobilising another reading, this paper could have addressed 
a more explicitly artistic kind of “acting”, and indeed perhaps 
professional actors could reveal more about phenomena where 
imagination and association lead the passage into action (although 
of course Antigone mobilises the spectacle of the theatre as the 
arena for exploring such questions). Presently however the “acts” in 
question are those directed more specifically towards performative 
approaches (Butler, 2000) that engage the more mundanely ethical-
political in and in relation to, analysis. That is, how our everyday 
modes of interaction and engagement – including therapeutic modes 
of relating – produce as well as reproduce certain practices that are 
inevitably ethical-political, as well as – sometimes perhaps – analytical 
or therapeutic.
In these days of neoliberalism, where the only actions and agents 
seem to be related to the market and consumption, it seems hard 
to formulate other models of activity and engagement. Self help, 
self care, the personal domain and the subject, are all equated with 
the individual, and it becomes harder and harder to envisage more 
collective forms of action. Increasingly, people in distress are exhorted 
to consult experts and to have individual counselling or therapy. 
To counter this, group therapies try to survive on the rather false 
rationale that they are cheap (but rarely quick), and psychoanalysts 
look set to disappear from publicly funded settings – or else they 
turn themselves into practitioners of some non-analytic therapy of 
mindfulness, mentalisation or suchlike.
A quick tour through the literature suggests that “acting in” is less 
often spoken about than “acting out”;  both of course carry pejorative 
connotations within psychoanalytic approaches as something rendered 
into action, rather than symbolized and therefore worked through. In 
the group analytic literature, “acting in” is surprisingly little discussed 
– perhaps since the work of the group brings so much action into the 
group (and so much acting out in relation to its boundaries). 
Hence although groups are nearly always in the grip of some 
action or other, including the analyst (whose job it is to try to keep 
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thinking as well as feeling), as with much other psychoanalysis, 
explicit engagement with activity outside the therapy room is either 
shied away from, or grandiosely overstated (as where some analysts 
claim to solve world problems by convening small groups of elites). 
In the Workbook of Group Analytic Interventions (Kennard, Roberts 
and Winter, 1993) – a presciently postmodern book presenting 20 
or more group analysts’ responses to some commonly encountered 
challenging situations occurring in groups – it is clear that, for 
example, allowing the group to eat the mince pies brought to the 
group before the Christmas break, and even joining in with this, before 
inviting members to reflect upon and discuss what function this is 
fulfilling for them, is acceptable or even recommended. The action 
is brought into the group as material available to all its members for 
discussion; proscribing it, or responding censoriously or moralistically, 
is understood to hinder or suppress the analytic work of the group in 
its project to “overhear” and render social, the coded “mumbling” (as 
Foulkes puts it) of the symptom.5
Thus the question of “how to act” in groups is rather different from 
individual work. This arises from the rather obvious - but nevertheless 
powerful - fact that when working with groups the analyst is always a 
participant, always subject to the gaze of the other group members, 
and involved in the flow of action and interaction. Group analysis 
is “…by the group, in the group, including its conductor” (Foulkes, 
1986, p. 3). 
This at the very least renders comprehensible  how “race”, 
gender, sexuality, colour, class etc. , that is, all symbolically structured, 
embodied axes of social relations and identifications, come to be part 
of the analytic situation. Similarly, the group analytic term “dynamic 
administration” highlights how bureaucratic and material features have 
a dynamic significance, ranging from referral letters and pathways, 
5  As in the oft quoted text: “The language of the symptom, although already a form of communication, 
is autistic.  It mumbles to itself secretly, hoping to be overheard; its equivalent meaning conveyed 
in words is social. This process of communication is the medium of all other therapeutic agencies… 
Thus there is a move from symptom to problem, from dream to the conflict underlying the dream.” 
(Foulkes, S .H. & Anthony, E.,1957, pp. 259-260).
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through to the arrangement and state of the chairs in the circle,  the 
lighting and heating:  each being a part of the remit of action  and 
interpretation on the part of the analyst. 
Both Lacanian and group analytic models focus on the central role 
of the Other, drawing on the metaphor of the mirror as generating 
imaginary reflections that may be necessary but are also in need of 
amendment. While Pines makes some connections with Lacan6, he 
later quotes Foulkes as putting it like this:
Mirror reactions are characteristically brought out when a number of 
persons meet and interact. A person sees himself – often a repressed part 
of himself – reflected in the interactions of the other group members. He 
also gets to know himself – and this is a fundamental process of ego-
development by the effect he has on others and the picture they form of 
him. A certain degree of disillusionment about one’s self, of deception as 
regards others, needs to be integrated into the self’s education. 
(Foulkes 1964, p.110, as cited in Pines, 1998, p. 84)
But mixing gestalt ideas with Goldstein’s neurological ideas focusing 
on networks – indicated by his use of the term “group conductor” 
rather than therapist or leader -  Foulkes’ idea of the “total situation” 
that groups comprise, is sensitive to how wider socio-cultural currents 
inevitably inflect and reverberate within the smaller group matrix. The 
interplay between the material, cultural “foundation matrix” and its 
specific moment-by-moment reconfiguration within the interaction 
of the group (the “dynamic matrix”) is based on a thorough going 
social theory of the psyche: “What is inside is outside, the social is 
not external but very much internal too and penetrates the innermost 
being of the individual personality” (Foulkes, 1990, p. 227).  
Yet perhaps it is precisely because so much goes on in analytic 
groups, that group analysis largely involves attempting to slow down 
or stop action, rather like its psychoanalytic forebear. Hence the 
6  In a specific essay entitled Mirroring and child development: psychodynamic and psychological 
interpretations, (pp. 41-59) in Circular reflections: Selected papers on group analysis and 
psychoanalysis. London: Jessica Kingsley.
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tradition of “activity groups” belongs as  Hinshelwood (1999) notes, 
to another psychoanalytic tradition (as also part of the  historical 
tensions between varieties of group therapy originated via Bion and 
then Bridger). Even from their inception, it seems that Foulkes was 
less interested in these. This is despite the fact that the focus on 
activity, on physical and practical work, itself part of the therapy, is of 
course what inspired the therapeutic community movement [TC], in 
some forms as a libertarian link between therapy, work and activist 
politics (Spandler, 2006). In fact, many group analysts were very active 
in the TC movement, and inspired in many ways precisely through the 
First and Second Northfield Experiments.7 
Act III: Antigone in/and the Group
In Lacanian circles discussions of ethics usually draw on treatments 
of Antigone. Much is made, by Butler (2000) among others, of how 
Antigone is constitutionally predisposed not to fit in, by virtue of her 
anomalous position within generational orders (as the offspring of 
an incestuous union). This is not a question of essentialised gender 
polarities: feminine relationality vs. hard male rule of law, but rather 
of orientation to knowledge, or the impossibility of such knowledge. 
As such, Antigone’s gender, sexuality and for that matter youth, or 
indeed any attribute of her person, is in itself not relevant. She is not, 
as Neill (2005) points out, an ethical exemplar but rather an example 
of the problematic of the ethical.
According to such analyses, the conflict between Antigone and 
Creon is less a matter of individual ethical impulse contesting public 
duty, nor even of showing how Antigone’s apparent death-wish (in 
declaring and acting on her commitment to bury her brother Polynices) 
7  The “Northfield Experiments” were innovations in group therapy for soldiers injured and 
traumatised during the Second World War initiated by Tom Main, John Rickman, Harold Bridger 
and especially Wilfred Bion and then S.H. Foulkes at Northfield Hospital during the early 1940s. 
Their contributions are discussed further later in this article.
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is truer to desire than the death-loving super-egoic functions of the 
law. Copjec (2004) offers an analysis in terms of the structure of 
sublimation, formulating a Lacanian-based theory of feminist ethics, 
while De Kesel (2009) reads in Lacan’s treatment, a parable of the 
contradictions of human subjectivity, of life’s link with death as a 
relationship between meaning and its limits necessarily conducted 
within a symbolic system. In this sense Antigone’s act does not 
mobilise a radical claim of something totally outside or other to the 
law but rather exposes its limit, and in so doing she also shows us the 
desire that we are:
…she makes clear how the entire order, with its power and law, 
is at one and the same time desire and lack. Under circumstances 
where the law appears omnipresent and all- powerful, she assumed 
precisely the place where the law comes up against its own limits,
thereby revealing how it cannot give or realize what it promises. (De 
Kesel, 2009, p.222)
Armed with this analysis of the relation between law, lack and desire, 
certain other actions can be considered. Much is made of Lacan’s 
founding act in 1964 (Lacan, 1964/1987)8. But what kind of act was 
Foulkes’ founding of group analysis?
There is a link here with the question of desire….
Act IV: The Ethics of Groups
Within psychoanalysis - after Freud’s (1921) rather dismal account 
based on the very specific institutional groups of church and army - 
groups are often viewed with suspicion, as compromising individual 
freedom, pressurising conformity, and – after Le Bon – of even making 
8  As is well known, as an act this was (1) mitigated or compromised by the fact that the name of the 
school changed 3 months later; and (2) the mode of introduction of this act troubled the relations 
between actor and audience by taking the form of a pre-recorded message played to a group of 
around 80 “dumbfounded listeners” (Roudinesco, 199, p. 309).
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people lose their individual minds. Within the Lacanian frame analysis 
of course proceeds “one by one”9. Lacan is on record as expressing 
suspicion of group processes as “sticky”, using the term “cartel” to 
reflect how organisations are vulnerable to mixing bureaucracy with 
authoritarianism (discourse of the university and the master) (Miller, 
1986). 
Despite (or because of) this Lacan devised an organisational 
structure based on small groups, whilst maintaining this strictly 
individualist focus. Yet his “logical time problem” (Lacan, 2006) 
dramatically illustrates the social structuring of identification and the 
necessary action(s) of others in configuring the subject. Alongside this 
we might note - as significant intervention in and against mainstream 
British psychoanalytic currents - how group analysis, from its social 
theory contributed by Norbert Elias, privileges the action of the outside 
in constructing the interiority of the subject: 
Elias’s influence on group analysis is that we constantly examine the 
question of the psychoanalytic primacy of projection over introjection. His 
legacy is the enduring challenge made by group analysts that psychology, 
including psychoanalysis, has not yet accepted the depth of the social 
within each one of us.  (Pines, 2002, p. 16)
Indeed, irrespective of its pretensions, psychoanalysis has always 
been active in and implicated in action – its variable stance on the 
politics of sexuality a case in point. As with the rest of psychoanalysis, 
the development of group therapies owes a great deal to large 
group destructive events and manipulative agendas.10 Just as 
psychoanalysis gained legitimacy through the distress of traumatised 
(“shell-shocked”) soldiers in the First World War, so group therapies 
emerged in England as part of a project of rehabilitation to return 
9  There are also grounds for speculation about other reasons for this, including how the small size of 
groups was considered so as preventing the formation of political pressure groups within the new 
organisation: “the idea was to organize groups that would be groups, without taking themselves 
as pressure groups. It is a factor in the choice of the reduction to four” (Laurent, 2000, p. 44).
10  As acknowledged by the book that Lacan discusses at length The Shaping of Psychiatry by the War 
by Brigadier General Rees (also director of the Tavistock Clinic). 
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soldiers to combat in World War 2. This is the story of Northfield 
Hospital, and the contested field of claims to the origins of a properly 
psychoanalytic group therapy emerges, from Bion to Foulkes and 
others.11
It is well known that Foulkes had been running groups for 
both therapeutic and research purposes from 1940 in Exeter (with 
Eve Lewis), and he was brought into Northfield as both qualified 
psychoanalyst (unlike Bion) (Nitzgen, 2008)12 and as an experienced 
group practitioner. Depending on theoretical allegiance, accounts 
of the success and influence of Bion and Foulkes’ style of group 
conductorship and composition vary (Hinshelwood, 1999; Nitzgen, 
2008). Hinshelwood rather knowingly styles their relationship as 
a “non-encounter” (ibid, p. 467) since Foulkes succeeded Bion at 
Northfield.  It is also worth noting that, after a five week visit to Britain 
in 1945 in which he met Bion and Rickman, Lacan wrote approvingly 
of their experiments with groups, devoting an extensive discussion to 
their work (Lacan 1946/2000), while both Eric Laurent (2000) and Philip 
Cravers (2000) claim this as a key influence in Lacan’s formulation 
of the cartel.13  Foulkes however is not mentioned by Lacan, nor by 
Lacanians – another “non-encounter”, it seems.14
“Apocryphally” (Hinshelwood, 1999, p. 475), it is said that Foulkes 
started his Northfield groups by saying “Whilst in the group we are not 
in the army” (ibid.). What kind of an act was this? Since it was patently 
untrue (Northfield was, after all, a military hospital), was this statement 
11  Pines (1998), offers a fairly non-judgmental historical review in his chapter A history of 
psychodynamic psychiatry in Britain in his book Circular Reflections.
12  “In fact Foulkes was one of the few fully trained psychoanalysts in Northfield. Rickman and Carroll 
were fully trained but Bion, Bridger and Main had not.” (Nitzgen, 2008, p. 335)
13  Main was of course senior to both Bion and Foulkes in the military hierarchy at Northfield (see 
Hinshelwood, 1999).
14  Since Laurent (2000) and Dravers (2000) make much of the influence of Bion on Lacan’s ideas 
of the group (along with his knowledge of Lewin), it is tempting to speculate how this model 
might have been different had he encountered Foulkes’ work instead/as well. It is noteworthy 
that the Editorial Preface to this journal issue explicitly denies the existence of both group analysis 
and the availability of the notion of the “social unconscious”: “Although group analysis does not 
exist, it is within the group, within the logic of its social dimensions, where Lacan will situate 
psychoanalysis and its place of work. Group analysis does not exist because there is no collective 
or social unconscious, which did not prevent Lacan, quite the contrary, from emphasising that the 
subject’s dimension derives from the communal bond.” (Wolf, 2000, p.7)
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a disingenuous acting out, or a provocatively performative prefiguration 
of a discursive space beyond the immediate organisational (military) 
agendas? While (as Lacan enthusiastically discusses) Bion attempted 
a military-style campaign to boost morale and unify the men against 
their common enemy, neurosis - so re-socialising the men back into 
the military fold - Foulkes started from a different position.15  Foulkes’ 
strategy was to address individual distress through the promotion of 
“free floating discussion”, the group equivalent of “free association”. 
As Hinshelwood notes: 
This was not a conformist requirement on the individual to toe the line of 
group norms… The individual needs to be brought into the group, not as 
a Mr Average, but as an individual who can express (communicate) his 
individuality better and more congenially within the context of the group. 
(Hinshelwood, 1999, p. 474)
In this sense, Foulkes rejected the reduction of the individual to the 
social (so repudiating notions of “group mind”16), whilst nevertheless 
exploring how wider social currents and institutional agendas influence 
individuals17; further, his model of group analysis is not concerned 
15  Indeed Foulkes’ position was very different, as he intimates in 1948: “I have been told that my own 
conduct of therapeutic groups follows the “leaderless Group” principles. This is, I believe, partly 
true, but if so, I followed it long before it actually existed. Through an unfortunate coincidence 
of foreign birth, which I regret, it was not possible for me to participate in the W.O.S.B. work, 
and I heard only comparatively late of the leaderless groups. However, John Rickman’s visits to 
Northfield proved a great stimulus in this respect, and H. Bridger, who came from W.O.S.B. work, 
played an integral part in the Northfield Experiment – in fact he conducted it from the point of view 
of social activities. (p.17). What is being alluded to in the “unfortunate coincidence of foreign birth” 
is the fact of his German nationality and refugee status, which apparently disqualified him from 
being involved in the War Office Selection Board activities. Beyond this, in terms of the Lacanian 
versions of these events, we might note that taking seriously Foulkes’ contribution at Northfield 
(irrespective of the resolution of the claims to originality etc) would rather disrupt the dichotomous 
discourse of British vs. French psychiatry and their social roles (within and after the War) put 
forward by both Lacan himself (Lacan 1946/2000), Eric Laurent (2000) and Philip Dravers (2000).
16  The notion of “group mind” should not be confused with the extensive discussions in group 
analysis, initiated by Foulkes, on the “social unconscious” (e.g. Dalal, 1998; Hopper, 2003).
17  Foulkes’ (1969) comments makes this clear: “Illness emerges as a social, interpersonal process. 
Its psychosocial analysis is of particular value in bringing to light the concealed meaning and 
significances of the many guises in which illness appears. It furnishes a key, in particular, to the 
approach to unconscious processes in three areas: the personal, repressed meaning, based on the 
original family groups, in psychoanalysis; the unconscious, interpersonal interaction, the “social 
unconscious” in group analysis; the society’s ills, and thus the unconscious origins of much human 
behaviour.”(Foulkes, 1979, p.24)
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with adapting people to groups but with exploring what is at issue in 
the individual’s struggle to relate to groups, with the developmental 
trajectory being “from autonomy to heteronomy” (Pines, 1998, p. 83).
Act V: Why (the positive view of) Groups?
There is another reading of action and acting out at play in the history 
of group analysis. Foulkes was a refugee from Nazism. He arrived 
in England in May 1933 as one of the first analysts invited to safety 
by Ernest Jones. He had to undergo requalification, as is the fate 
of many professional migrants, in his case as both medical doctor 
and psychoanalyst. Although eligible as a member of the British 
Psychoanalytic Society, many commentators have noted that he 
remained marginal to it, having little to do with its theoretical debates 
including the “controversial discussions” between Melanie Klein 
and Anna Freud, yet - like Norbert Elias - appearing also to harbour 
resentment over the lack of recognition accorded his work.18 Just as 
many have speculated about what prompted Elias to write his book 
The Civilising Process at the brink of one of the most “uncivilised” 
periods of modern European history, so group analysts have 
speculated about why Foulkes arrived at his positive commitment to 
groups, ranging from his position as “unwanted” youngest child, to 
his forced migration:
How much did Foulkes’ struggle to differentiate psychoanalysis from 
group analysis parallel his problems of transition from one country to 
another? How much were the problems of theoretical separation between 
disciplines connected with issues of emotional separation in his life? To 
18  In the section (pp. 19-21) on “The Northfield Experiment”, Foulkes (1948) writes: “As to the 
Northfield Experiment, my own function happened to be a rather important one. Firstly, I was the 
only person who observed it actively all the way through. I was at Northfield for over a year before 
there was any Northfield Experiment, except on my own ward, so to speak!..” (p.18) (Nitzgen, 
(2008, p.335) points out that this is not strictly speaking true, since Bion had left by the time 
that Foulkes arrived.) Writing of “the Northfield Experiment proper (Phase B)” (p.19) he notes 
“The fact that I myself was a Senior Psychiatrist and recognized Psycho-analyst helped Bridger 
considerably…”( ibid.)
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what extent did the hostility he encountered at the Institute of Psycho-
Analysis influence the idealised way in which he presented group analysis? 
(Nitsun, 1996, p. 20)
Of course all histories are histories of the present, and the claims 
made for the need for “a deeper appreciation of the role of 
aggression and disintegration in group life” (Nitsun, 1996, p. 41) 
clearly coincided with a turn towards object relations and Kleinian 
theory, a rapprochement that perhaps enabled greater integration 
into the British psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic scene for a 
second generation of group analysts, but nevertheless occurred at 
the cost of compromising some of the distinctive features of group 
analysis.19 It should be noted that Nitsun’s contribution of the notion 
of the “anti-group” to the group analytic lexicon gained such success 
that he later amended (or supplemented) this focus on the negative, 
destructive characteristics of groups with the notion of the “group 
as object of desire”, elaborating a distinctly non-Lacanian approach 
which nevertheless seeks to recover the dynamics of creativity and 
sexuality as positive forces within group-work (Nitsun, 2006).
Taking a more Lacanian route, to “read Foulkes by the letter” 
(Nitzgen, 2008, p. 341), Nitzgen points to the dynamic significance 
of shifts of signification within Foulkes’ life, including the changes he 
made both to his first and second names (from Sigmund Heinrich to 
(the more “modern”) Heinz during the period of his psychoanalytic 
training, and then – although still using the initials S.H. in his 
publications becoming known to his family, friends and colleagues 
as “Michael”. He also anglicised his name from Fuchs to Foulkes 
(a spelling that remained true to its pronunciation in German but 
rendered it more “English” in appearance). Hence Nitzgen (2008) 
claims Foulkes’ invention of group analysis coincides with bringing 
the signifier “volk”, or people, into his name.
While Nitsun’s (1986) project was oriented – explicitly - against an 
19 And certainly, in my view, prejudicing those that connect more closely with Lacanian psychoanalysis.
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idealisation of Foulkes as the founding father, this itself alludes to the 
kinds of transference to the training institution to which all trainees 
are subject (Nitzgen, 1999). What is highlighted here are the ways that 
the trajectory of group analysis has reflected a particular synthesis 
of individual, group and cohort dynamics that have structured the 
specific forms of its development in England.20 This leads on to the 
question of adaptation.
Act VI: Questions of Adaptation/Inside and Outside the 
Clinic
Group analysis has a different view of the limits/boundaries around 
analysis from Lacanian approaches (Parker, 2011) by virtue of its 
explicitly social model that disallows an absolute distinction to be 
maintained between clinical and non-clinical contexts or “pure” and 
“applied” psychoanalysis. This question also touches on a very current 
debate about whether or not group analysis is a specifically therapeutic 
approach, according to which other epithets such as “applied” would 
then be attached to indicate its non-therapeutic uses. Yet (as Nitzgen, 
2008, also emphasises), from his earliest formulations (and forms of 
practice), Foulkes clearly envisaged group analysis as a method of 
understanding groups21, rather than specifically being configured for 
therapeutic purposes (with the “slow open” “stranger group” model 
only emerging as a later feature).
Now, the question of adaptation (which was also discussed by 
Lacan in his account of his visit to Northfield) also ushers in other 
equally troubling group analytic notions of “ego training in action” and 
“corrective emotional experience”. These are often cited along with 
Yalom’s (1975) identification of “socialization” as one of the common 
20 I know too little about its development elsewhere to comment on this.
21  As indicated in the first sentence of the Preface to his first book “Group-Analysis is a form 
Psychotherapy in small Groups and also a Method of studying Groups and the behaviour of Human 
Individuals in their social aspects” (Foulkes, 1948/83,vii, Preface) and “Our domain remains clinical 
research in life, experiment in action” (Foulkes 1969, p.19)
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features of all group therapies. Yet one of the distinctive features 
of group analysis (as opposed to the Tavistock approaches) is that 
it is not about adapting the individual to the group, in the sense of 
subordinating the interests and qualities of the individual or privileging 
group functioning over individual functioning. 
… each individual is to a large extent a part of the Group, to which he 
belongs. This collective aspect permeates him all through – as we have 
said before – to his core. To a smaller extent he deviates from the abstract 
Model, the Standard of this “Norm”, he is a variant of it. Just this deviation 
makes him into an Individual, unique, which he is again all through, even to 
the finger prints….Group treatment has nothing to do with making people 
uniformly march in step. Quite the contrary; good Group treatment – by 
developing a good Group – makes both processes go hand in hand: the 
reinforcement of the communal ground and the freer development of 
individual differences. (Foulkes, 1948/1983, p.30)
Here the contrast between “hand in hand” is evoked, rather than 
“marching in step” as an implicit counterproposal to military psychiatry 
perhaps.
Recently Nitzgen (2008) has reclaimed adaptation as a positive 
feature – as indicating a sensitivity to the contemporary external 
context, the “total situation” of the shared social unconscious 
context in which individual and group functioning occur. Not only has 
group analysis developed, he argues, through adaptation to context 
but it also insists on an engagement with such contexts as central to 
therapeutic outcomes for participants.22 
Moreover some features of Foulkes’ more radically social vision 
have yet to be fully addressed, as in his claim that distress is not 
only an individual matter: “neurosis itself must be seen as a multi-
personal manifestation” (Foulkes, 1990, p. 206). Perhaps this notion 
may be applied to the question of action too. As De Kesel comments 
22  He returns to the example from Northfield he discussed earlier (Nitzgen, 2002) of the disagreement 
between two pianists in the band, which turns not merely on individual or local group dynamics but 
on the wider anxiety of being discharged because well enough to be returned to military service.
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of Antigone: 
Her autonomy is not that of a free subject in the voluntarist sense of the
word, but that of a subject insofar as it is the “bearer” of a desire, a desire,
note, that is that of the (symbolic) Other. Neither the real, nor the fixed 
signified, but the signifier and (which amounts to the same thing) the
“desire of the Other” lay down the law to her.” (De Kesel, 2009, p. 223)
How to act is not, or not only, a technical question. Drawing out 
implications for processes of training, Nitzgen ends his paper by 
arguing for the role of ethics and desire: 
That the group analytic attitude is not technical, but ethical in nature, is 
already implicit in Foulkes’ basic assumption that group associations have 
the “value” of unconscious interpretations (Foulkes & Anthony, 1957, p. 
29). Making this “decisive step” regarding method as well as theory (1957, 
p. 29) he came to accept that within the context of the group-analytic 
situation all “ideas and comments” expressed by group members are 
valuable and to be valued as such and as a contribution to the whole. This 
is clearly an ethical assumption (with no moralist overtones). …Calling on 
Lacan and Foulkes  one might say that what is important in analytic training 
beyond the vicissitudes of love and hate “is to teach the subject to name, 
to articulate, to bring his desire into existence” (Lacan, 1954-5, p. 228). 
(Nitzgen, 1999, p. 238).
Conclusion
This paper opened by declaring a position for the author as activist as 
well as analyst. Yet the discussion of acting (in and out) could be seen 
to invite a pathologising reading of activism. Undoubtedly activism – 
with its edge of agitation, with its necessary engagement of desire 
and the relation with the other – cannot anticipate all its effects. But 
the aim of this paper was also to indicate how both group analysis and 
Lacanian psychoanalysis are drawn to a model of the social structuring 
of subjectivity, via their respective understandings of the relationship 
between the unconscious and the other that fundamentally privileges 
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interaction – and so action – over reflection, and so warrants more of a 
connection between action and activism than either Foulkes or Lacan 
(and also Freud) would perhaps have personally allowed. Yet precisely 
by using their ideas it is possible perhaps to understand how, in each 
of their founding acts, and between the various connections between 
groups, action and activism, neither could have known quite what 
they had set in train.
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